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Abstract Apathy is commonly described following traumatic
brain injury (TBI) and is associated with serious conse-
quences, notably for patients’ participation in rehabilitation,
family life and later social reintegration. There is strong evi-
dence in the literature of the multidimensional nature of apa-
thy (behavioural, cognitive and emotional), but the processes
underlying each dimension are still unclear. The purpose of
this article is first, to provide a critical review of the current
definitions and instruments used to measure apathy in neuro-
logical and psychiatric disorders, and second, to review the
prevalence, characteristics, neuroanatomical correlates, rela-
tionships with other neurobehavioural disorders and mecha-
nisms of apathy in the TBI population. In this context, we
propose a new multidimensional framework that takes into
account the various mechanisms at play in the facets of apathy,
including not only cognitive factors, especially executive, but
also affective factors (e.g., negative mood), motivational
variables (e.g., anticipatory pleasure) and aspects related to
personal identity (e.g., self-esteem). Future investigations that
consider these various factors will help improve the under-
standing of apathy. This theoretical framework opens up rel-
evant prospects for better clinical assessment and rehabilita-
tion of these frequently described motivational disorders in
patients with brain injury.
Keywords Apathy . Traumatic brain injury .Motivation .
Depression . Executive functions . Self-esteem
Introduction
Apathetic manifestations are common across a wide variety of
neurological and psychiatric conditions, such as traumatic
brain injury (TBI; Lane-Brown and Tate 2009), disorders
involving the basal ganglia (Stuss et al. 2000; Pluck and
Brown 2002), Alzheimer’s disease (Fernandez Martinez
et al. 2008) and cerebrovascular accident (Andersson et al.
1999b; Jorge et al. 2010). Apathy not only appears to be
common, but it has also been related to a wide range of
negative consequences for the patients and their caregivers.
Indeed, apathy has been associated with a poor recovery and
rehabilitation outcome (Gray et al. 1994; Hama et al. 2007),
loss of social autonomy (Prigatano 1992; Mazaux et al. 1997),
financial and vocational loss (Lane-Brown and Tate 2009),
cognitive decline (Dujardin et al. 2007; Robert et al. 2002;
2006) and caregiver distress (Marsh et al. 1998; Willer et al.
2001). Despite the important prevalence of this problematic
manifestation and its social and economic costs, apathy is
defined in a number of different ways (Lane-Brown and Tate
2009) and its underlying psychological processes are poorly
understood. The lack of clarity surrounding the construct of
apathy has the unfortunate consequence that apathy is often
neglected in clinical practice and rehabilitation programmes
are not targeted. In this context, the main objective of this
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article is to open up relevant prospects for better clinical
assessment and rehabilitation of these frequently described
apathetic manifestations after a TBI. In this perspective, the
first part of the present article reviews the current definitions
of apathy and its assessment tools, and proposes a discussion
of their limitations. The second part of the article presents the
existing findings related to apathy in the TBI population (the
prevalence, neuroanatomical correlates, relationships with
other neurobehavioural disorders, and the psychological pro-
cesses involved). Based on all these data, a new approach to
apathy after TBI is proposed that assume four dimensions of
apathy (cognitive, affective, motivational, and related to per-
sonal identity), which are defined by a precise identification of
the various mechanisms potentially involved.
Current Conceptions of Apathy
Definitions of Apathy
The concept of apathy is found in various sections of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th
ed., text rev.; DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association
2000) and in the definitions of many types of disorders (Clarke
et al. 2011). By contrast, the International Classification of
Diseases (ICD-10;World HealthOrganization 1993) makes no
reference to apathy. Marin (1991) differentiated between apa-
thy as a symptom of other problems (such as emotional distress
or an altered level of consciousness) and apathy as a syndrome.
In the latter, the key feature, according to Marin, is a lack of
motivation, characterised by diminished goal-directed cogni-
tion (as manifested by decreased interests, a lack of plans and
goals, and a lack of concern about one’s own health or func-
tional status), diminished goal-directed behaviour (as
manifested by a lack of effort, initiative and productivity) and
reduced emotional concomitants of goal-directed behaviours
(as manifested by flat affect, emotional indifference and re-
stricted responses to important life events). Goal-directed be-
haviour is defined as a set of related processes (motivational,
emotional, cognitive and motor) by which an internal state is
translated, through action, into the attainment of a goal
(Schultz 1999; Brown and Pluck 2000). More specifically,
the “goal” can be immediate and physical, such as relieving
thirst, or long-term and abstract, such as being successful in
one’s job or pursuing happiness. The term “directed” means
that the action is mediated by knowledge of the contingency
between the action and the outcome (Dickinson and Balleine
1994). The diversity of psychological mechanisms involved in
goal-directed behaviours, which are central in Marin’s formu-
lation of apathy, argue in favour of a multifactorial model of
apathy. Marin’s concept was later put into practice by
Starkstein et al. (2001) in a set of diagnostic criteria for apathy,
as follows: (A) lack of motivation relative to the patient’s
previous level of functioning or the standards of his or her
age and culture as indicated by subjective account or observa-
tion by others; (B) presence for at least 4 weeks during most of
the day, of at least one symptom belonging to each of the
following three domains: (i) diminished goal-directed behav-
iour, (ii) diminished goal-directed cognition and (iii) dimin-
ished concomitants of goal-directed behaviour; (C) the symp-
toms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in
social, occupational or other important areas of functioning;
and (D) the symptoms are not due to diminished level of
consciousness or the direct physiological effects of a
substance.
Stuss et al. (2000) argued that apathy cannot be clinically
defined as a lack of motivation, as did Marin (1991), notably
because the assessment of motivation is problematic and
usually requires inferences based on observations of affect
or behaviour. The authors suggested that apathy should be
defined as “an absence of responsiveness to stimuli—internal
or external—as demonstrated by a lack of self-initiated ac-
tion”. Consequently, the construct of initiation is central to
Stuss et al.’s definition. Stuss et al. (2000) also postulated that
apathy may represent a number of related but separable states,
depending on the neural substrates involved and the functional
disturbances (cognitive, behavioural, affective) underlying the
clinical presentation. According to the authors, the involve-
ment of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex circuit may result in
an absence of initiated behaviour due to an executive dysfunc-
tion disorder affecting cognitive flexibility, planning and nov-
el responsiveness, among other things. Involvement of the
lateral orbitofrontal cortex would lead to apathy associated
with a lack of limbic affective input, including processes such
as reward sensitivity and an interest in new learning, while
involvement of the anterior cingulate may result in apathy due
to a reduction in direct motivational response to external and
internal stimuli. The authors also posited a type of apathy
termed “social apathy”, which takes the form of impaired self
and social awareness due to lesions in anterior frontal regions.
Other investigators emphasised that the lack of spontaneity
observed among apathetic patients can be reverted by external
cues. In this sense, constructs such as the auto-activation
deficit (AAD; Levy and Dubois 2006) and athymhormia
(Habib 2004) describe patients who are incapable of self-
activating thoughts or self-initiating actions but who have a
relatively spared ability to generate externally driven behav-
iour. In line with Stuss et al. (2000), Levy and Dubois (2006)
divided apathetic syndrome into three subtypes (emotional,
cognitive and behavioural) but replaced the behavioural
subtype with the concept of auto-activation. The disruption
of auto-activation processing may result in the most severe
form of apathy, in most cases the lesions bilaterally affecting
the associative and limbic areas of the internal portion of the
globus pallidus. Consequently, Levy and Dubois (2006) de-
fined apathy as “the quantitative reduction of self-generated,
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voluntary and purposeful behaviours” and suggested the fol-
lowing subtypes of apathy: emotional-affective (inability to
associate affective/emotional signals, such as interest, with
ongoing and forthcoming behaviours), cognitive (inability to
elaborate a plan of action due to impairments in several
executive functions, including planning, flexibility and rule
finding) and auto-activation (inability to activate thoughts or
initiate action).
Recently, a new set of diagnostic criteria for apathy has
been proposed (Robert et al. 2009; Mulin et al. 2011) in the
context of a consensus meeting that included members of the
European Psychiatric Association, the European Alzheimer’s
Disease Consortium and the Association Française de
Psychiatrie Biologique (see Table 1). The criteria follow the
same general structure as those proposed by Starkstein et al.
(2001), with changes specifically to the B criterion. According
toMulin et al. (2011), a diagnosis of apathy can bemade in the
presence of diminished motivation in comparison to the pa-
tient’s previous level of functioning (criterion A), and two of
the three following domains of apathy, which must be present
for at least 4 weeks (criterion B): (1) loss of or diminished
goal-directed behaviour, (2) loss of or diminished goal-
directed cognitive activity and (3) loss of or diminished emo-
tions. In addition, symptoms should cause clinically signifi-
cant impairment in various functional domains (criterion C).
Exclusion criteria specify symptoms that mimic apathy, such
as the direct physiological effects of a substance (criterion D).
More specifically, criterion B is based on the premise that
changes in motivation can be observed (and measured) by
examining a patient’s responsiveness to internal and external
stimuli. Consequently, each of the three proposed domains of
apathy (behaviour, cognition and emotion) includes two
symptoms: the first symptom pertains to self-initiated or “in-
ternal” actions, cognitions and emotions (“initiation symp-
tom”), and the second symptom to the patient’s responsive-
ness to “external” stimuli (“responsiveness symptom”).
Apathy Assessment Scales
Several instruments are currently used to measure the severity
of apathy in neurological and psychiatric disorders (see
Table 2) (see Clarke et al. 2011 for a review). Marin et al.
(1991) developed the Apathy Evaluation Scale (AES), an 18-
item scale that assesses apathy within the month prior to the
time of assessment and covers the behavioural, emotional and
cognitive aspects of apathy. Each item is rated on a 4-point
Likert scale, from 0 (not at all true) to 4 (very true). This scale
may be administered in a self-report version (AES-S), or may
be completed by relatives or caregivers (AES-I) or by a
clinician after a semi-structured interview with the participant
(AES-C). Its psychometric properties have been found to be
acceptable in some studies (Marin et al. 1994; Ramirez et al.
Table 1 Diagnostic criteria for apathy proposed by Mulin et al. (2011, p.159)
For a diagnosis of Apathy the patient should fulfill the criteria A, B, C and D.
A—Loss of or diminished motivation in comparison to the patient’s previous level of functioning and which is not consistent with his age or culture.
These changes in motivation may be reported by the patient himself or by the observations of others.
B—Presence of at least one symptom in at least two of the three following domains for a period of at least four weeks and present most of the time.
Domain B1—Behaviour:
Loss of, or diminished, goal-directed behaviour as evidenced by at least one of the following:
Initiation symptom: loss of self-initiated behaviour (for example: starting conversation, doing basic tasks of day-to-day living, seeking social
activities, communicating choices).
Responsiveness symptom: loss of environment-stimulated behaviour (for example: responding to conversation, participating in social
activities).
Domain B2—Cognition:
Loss of, or diminished, goal-directed cognitive activity as evidenced by at least one of the following:
Initiation symptom: loss of spontaneous ideas and curiosity for routine and new events (i.e., challenging tasks, recent news, social
opportunities, personal/family and social affairs).
Responsiveness symptom: loss of environment-stimulated ideas and curiosity for routine and new events (i.e., in the person’s residence,
neighbourhood or community).
Domain B3—Emotion:
Loss of, or diminished, emotion as evidenced by at least one of the following:
Initiation symptom: loss of spontaneous emotion, observed or self-reported (for example, subjective feeling of weak or absent emotions, or
observation by others of a blunted affect).
Responsiveness symptom: loss of emotional responsiveness to positive or negative stimuli or events (for example, observer-reports of
unchanging affect, or of little emotional reaction to exciting events, personal loss, serious illness, emotional-laden news).
C—These symptoms (A–B) cause clinically significant impairment in personal, social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
D—The symptom (A–B) are not exclusively explained or due to physical disabilities (e.g. blindness and loss of hearing), to motor disabilities, to
diminished level of consciousness or to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g. drug of abuse, a medication).
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2001; Lampe et al. 2001; Thompson et al. 2002; McPherson
et al. 2002), but not in others (Glenn et al. 2002). Indeed,
Glenn et al. (2002) reported they were unable to find a cut-off
score on the AES-S and AES-I with sufficiently high sensi-
tivity and specificity with respect to a clinician’s judgement of
the presence of apathy in patients with TBI. In terms of factor
structure, Marin et al. (1991) identified a three-factor structure
using a principal component analysis of the AES on each of
the rater sources (AES-S, AES-I, AES-C) in a study compris-
ing 123 subjects with right or left hemisphere stroke, probable
Alzheimer’s disease, major depression as well as healthy
elderly controls. Subsequent factor analytic studies of the
AES have reported somewhat different factor structures
(Sagen et al. 2010). For instance, Ahearn et al. (2012) reported
a two-factor solution of the AES-C version in a group of 99
patients with Parkinson’s disease. Taken together, further fac-
tor analyses, especially confirmatory factor analyses (CFA),
are needed to more specifically examine the factor structure of
the scale in different patient sample.
The 14-item Apathy Scale (AS) was developed by
Starkstein et al. (1992) as a simplified version of Marin’s
instrument, and therefore has six items in common with it.
The ASwas validated for use in small-sample-sized studies, in
patients with Parkinson’s disease (Starkstein et al. 1992) and
Alzheimer’s disease (Starkstein et al. 2001), and in patients
who have had a stroke (Starkstein et al. 1993). A recent
internal consistency reliability analysis of the items from the
AS revealed that they all positively correlated with the total
apathy score between .4 and .7, except for item 3 (“Are you
concerned about your condition?”; Kirsch-Darrow et al.
2011). This item had a negative correlation with the total score
(r=−.14), and the analyses showed that deleting this item
improved internal consistency reliability (i.e., Cronbach’s al-
pha) from .831 to .855. Accordingly, Pedersen et al. (2012)
showed in a group of 194 non-demented patients with early
untreated PD that item 3 of the AS had a negative item-total
correlation, and that removal this item raised the Cronbach’sα
but did not substantially alter the others psychometric proper-
ties. Besides, the authors conducted an exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) that identified two factors. To the best of our
knowledge, the 16 items of the AS were not submitted to a
CFA.
Apathy is also assessed as a specific component of the
Neuropsychiatric Inventory (NPI), a multidimensional instru-
ment that was developed to quantify neurobehavioural distur-
bances in patients with dementia and caregiver distress caused
by such behaviours (Cummings et al. 1994). The NPI is based
on a structured interview with a caregiver who is familiar with
the patient. A screening question is asked first, followed by
subquestions if the response to the screening question sug-
gests the presence of abnormalities involving the neuropsy-
chiatric domain. The frequency and the severity are then
explored, as well as the caregiver distress associated with the
neuropsychiatric alteration. The subscale used to investigate
Table 2 Summary of the characteristics of the most commonly apathy measures
Apathy assessment scales Characterisitcs
Apathy Evaluation Scale
(AES)
Marin et al. (1991)
The AES is a 18-item scale that measures apathy over the past 4 weeks and covers the behavioural, emotional and cognitive
aspects of apathy. There are three versions of the scale: self (AES-S), informant (AES-I), caregiver (AES-C). The validity
of the scale has been examined in several neurological and psychiatric disorders. The psychometric properties are not
acceptable in all validation studies, notably in the TBI population.
Apathy Scale (AS)
Starkstein et al. (1992)
The 14-item AS is an abridged and slightly modified version of Marin’s instrument. Validation studies of the AES have
been conducted in small sample sizes of patients with Parkinson’s disease, patients with Alzheimer’s disease as well as
patients who have had a stroke. Some studies indicated that item 3 is ambiguous and should be removed from the scale to
increase its internal consistency. No CFE of the AS has been conducted.
Neuropsychiatric
Inventory (NPI)
Cummings et al. (1994)
The apathy subscale of the NPI is an informant-based interview that assesses the presence, frequency and severity of
apathetic symptoms. The evaluation is exclusively dependent on the opinion of a caregiver. The NPI-apathy subscale has
been mainly validated across a range of different types of neurodegenerative disease.
Apathy Inventory (AI)
Robert et al. (2002)
The AI provides a separate assessment of three dimensions of apathy (emotional blunting, lack of initiative, lack of
interest). The evaluation is based on changes that have occurred since the onset of the disease. There are two versions of
the scale: caregiver (AI-caregiver), patient (AI-patient). Validation of the AI has been demonstrated only by the scale’s
developer in a mixed sample consisting of patients with mild cognitive impairment, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s
disease as well as healthy controls. Given the brevity of the scale, the AI seems to constitute a first clinical exploration.
Lille Apathy Rating Scale
(LARS)
Sockeel et al. (2006)
The LARS is an extensive 33-item questionnaire that assesses apathy in the month prior to the evaluation. The items are
divided into nine domains and four subscales (intellectual curiosity, emotion, action initiation, self-awareness). Patient
and caregiver versions of the LARS exist. Most responses are coded on a dichotomous scale. Validation studies of the
LARS have been conducted in small sample sizes of patients with Parkinson’s disease.
Frontal Systems Behavior
Scale (FrSBe)
Grace et al. (1999)
The FrSBe-apathy subscale consists of 14 items. Rating is based on behaviours prior to the onset of the disease and current
behaviours. The scale has different versions: self, informant and clinician-rated. High internal consistency and good test-
retest reliability of the family version is reported. However, several factor analysis of the FrSBe did not confirm the factor
solution retained in the initial construction (i.e., apathy, disinhibition, executive dysfunction).
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apathy includes questions related to a loss of interest; lack of
motivation; decreased spontaneity, affection and enthusiasm;
loss of emotions; and disinterest in carrying out new activities.
Good internal consistency, test-retest, interrater reliabilities
and convergent validity of the NPI-apathy subscale have been
demonstrated in different samples, such as ambulatory pa-
tients with dementia, outpatients with Alzheimer’s disease
and nursing home residents (Clarke et al. 2011). Recently,
EFA and CFA of the NPI scores were conducted on data
collected from 491 caregivers of patients with Alzheimer’s
disease (Garre-Olmo et al. 2010). The CFA model that satis-
factorily grouped the NPI scores into three factors included a
psychotic syndrome, an affective syndrome and a behaviour
syndrome. Despite the demonstrated validity of the scale, the
evaluation depends only on the opinion of the caregiver, who
may not always be available or reliable (Sockeel et al. 2006).
Indeed, Lane-Brown and Tate (2009) emphasised that the use
of informants to rate apathy has some limitations in that
dimensions of apathy relate to the inherently subjective expe-
rience of internal drive and motivation. Likewise, some stud-
ies showed that apathetic patients reported more severe apathy
than that reported by the patients’ relatives (Muller et al. 2006;
McKinlay et al. 2008). Given these issues, obtaining reports
frommultiple informants, both patients and significant others,
is recommended (Lane-Brown and Tate 2009).
Robert et al. (2002) designed the Apathy Inventory (AI) as a
scale for the global assessment of apathy, with separate as-
sessments for emotional blunting, lack of initiative and lack of
interest. The AI consists of two sets of clinician-led inter-
views, one for the caregiver and one for the patient. Based
on the format of the NPI, frequency and severity are assessed
during the caregiver interview, while the patient is asked to
estimate intensity using a Likert-style scale (1–12). The ques-
tions deal with any behavioural changes that have occurred
since the onset of the disease. Validation of the AI was carried
out in a mixed sample consisting of healthy controls, patients
with mild cognitive impairment, patients with Alzheimer’s
disease as well as patients with Parkinson’s disease (Robert
et al. 2002). Good internal consistency, test-retest and
interrater reliabilities have been demonstrated by the scale’s
developer, but replication studies are needed (Clarke et al.
2011). Given the brevity of the scale, the AI seems to consti-
tute a first clinical exploration rather than a scale that allows
access to the complex aspects of apathy.
Based on the main conceptual principles proposed by
Marin et al. (1991), the Lille Apathy Rating Scale (LARS)
was developed to assess the multiple dimensions of apathetic
syndrome (Sockeel et al. 2006). The scale consists of a struc-
tured interview that assesses apathy within the month prior to
the time of the assessment. It includes 33 items that are
divided into nine different domains. Eight of these concern
the main clinical manifestations (reduction in everyday pro-
ductivity, lack of interest, lack of initiative, extinction of
novelty seeking and motivation, blunting of emotional re-
sponses, lack of concern and poor social life), while the ninth
refers to the loss of self-awareness. With the exception of the
first three questions (which are coded on a 5-point Likert-type
scale), responses are coded by the clinician on a dichotomous
(yes/no) scale, with an additional “NA” (not available) condi-
tion for non-classifiable answers or non-applicable items.
However, the yes-no answer format may not be sensitive to
change insofar as neither the premorbid condition, nor the
frequency of the disturbance in everyday life nor its impact
on others are taken into account. The LARS total score ranges
from −36 to +36 points, with higher scores indicating greater
apathy. Sockeel et al. (2006) conducted a factor analysis in a
sample of 159 patients with probable Parkinson’s disease that
revealed a four-factor structure, labelled intellectual curiosity,
emotion, action initiation and self-awareness. Internal consis-
tency of the LARS was found to be good (α=.80) and the
four-month test–retest reliability was very good (r=.95). To
the best of our knowledge, the 33 items of the LARS were not
submitted to a confirmatory factor analysis. An informant-
rated version of the scale (LARS-i) was also developed
(Dujardin et al. 2008). So far, the validity of the LARS has
been assessed only in patients with Parkinson’s disease
(Sockeel et al. 2006; Dujardin et al. 2007; Zahodne et al.
2009) and in small-sample-sized studies, particularly for the
caregiver-rated version whose validation was conducted in a
sample of 60 patients with probable Parkinson’s disease and
their respective caregivers (Dujardin et al. 2008).
The Frontal Systems Behaviour Scale (FrSBe) is a 46-item
scale that was designed to assess and quantify behavioural
disturbances associated with damage to the frontal-subcortical
brain circuits (Grace et al. 1999). The FrSBe is composed of
three subscales (related to three frontal lobe behavioural syn-
dromes, as proposed by Cummings in 1993): disinhibition,
apathy and executive dysfunction. The apathy subscale con-
sists of 14 items, each rated on a 5-point scale. Three different
versions are available (self, informant and clinician). For each
statement, ratings are given to indicate how often an individ-
ual engaged in a particular behaviour, both before and after the
onset of an illness or injury. An EFA performed by the test
developers (Stout et al. 2003) on data from a sample of 324
caregivers of patients with a “variety of neurological syn-
dromes” (about 63 % of whom were diagnosed with a neuro-
degenerative disease) led to the extraction of three factors.
These three factors were related to the three subscales pro-
posed on the basis of frontal systems behavioural theory. A
number of studies have reported fair to high internal consis-
tency for the FrSBe-apathy subscales, with Cronbach’s alpha
coefficients ranging from 0.72 to 0.88 (Grace and Malloy
2001; Velligan et al. 2002). The exploratory analysis suggests
that some revision or elimination of specific items may be
warranted to refine the scale and enhance the validity of the
subscales (Stout et al. 2003; Malloy and Grace 2005; Barrash
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et al. 2011). Indeed, Stout et al. (2003) found significant
correlations between the three factor scores indicating that
the subscales are not completely independent, which is not
surprising, because disinhibition, apathy and executive dys-
function partly involve the same psychological processes
(e.g., executive impairments). Recently, Niemeier et al.
(2013) conducted several CFA and EFA of the FrSBe in acute
TBI population, across both self-report and family-report ad-
ministration. The analysis failed to produce factors solutions
consistent with each or that resembled the factor solution
retained by Stout et al. (2003). Besides, the scale had suffi-
ciently high internal consistency, and good test–retest reliabil-
ity of the family version. The authors suggested that the FrSBe
is an appropriate measure for use in an inpatient TBI popula-
tion when using only the total score and the informants’
ratings, although its subscales and patient administration re-
quire additional psychometric research.
In summary, apathy is still defined in a number of different
ways and there exist many inconsistencies in the literature
regarding the assessment of this manifestation. Indeed, several
scales are currently available to assess apathy but, as seen
previously, these instruments have some methodological lim-
itations and their psychometric properties remain question-
able. As highlighted by Wood et al. (2008) in a recent review
that discusses issues surrounding the assessment and compre-
hension of behavioural disorders after acquired brain injury, a
clear theoretical or conceptual basis is required to develop
reliable and valid measures of neurobehavioural disability.
This drives item generation beyond the level of generalities
of observable behaviour and enables informed views on the
origins of these manifestations. Thus, it appears that various
theoretical limitations of the current approach to apathy could
compromise the establishment of a valid tool to assess apa-
thetic changes. In the next section, we discuss some of these
conceptual limits.
Limitations to the Current Approach to Apathy
As reviewed earlier, most definitions acknowledge that apathy
refers to a set of behavioural, cognitive and affective features.
There is some agreement within the literature that disorders of
interest, action initiation and emotional reactivity are all di-
mensions of apathy and that diminished goal-directed behav-
iour is at the core of the disorder. However, the exploration of
apathy remains mostly descriptive. Few studies have tried to
examine the mechanisms underlying each dimension of apa-
thy, notably for the emotional and motivational dimensions
(Starkstein and Leentjens 2008). Indeed, current conceptions
attempt to develop diagnostic criteria for apathy that “will be
easily applied in practice and research settings” (Robert et al.
2009), without taking into account the variety of mechanisms
at play in the facets of apathy. These models are congruent
with the descriptive approach adopted in the DSM-III
(American Psychiatric Association 1980) and its successors,
where disorders are made up of diagnostic categories defined
descriptively in terms of symptoms that have been observed to
co-vary in individuals. The phenomenon of symptom co-
variation was initially expected to indicate a common
aetiology, but the goal of clarifying these underlying factors
has remained elusive (Kendler and First 2010). Considerable
other evidence shows that the current DSM approach has
significant limitations in validity and clinical utility (Van
Praag 2000; Kendell 2002; Widiger and Trull 2007; Banzato
2008; Krueger and Bezdjian 2009; Jewell et al. 2009; Dalal
and Sivakumar 2009), for example, the fact that diagnostic
categories do not provide enough treatment specificity
(Kupfer et al. 2002; Skodol and Bender 2009). Precise iden-
tification of the underlying mechanisms is much needed to
ensure targeted and effective rehabilitation insofar as some
apathy traits result in similar overt behaviours but their aeti-
ologies may be heterogeneous.
Based on a categorical approach, the recent diagnostic
criteria for apathy proposed by Mulin et al. (2011) seem
arguable in some aspects. As indicated previously, the core
feature of these criteria is a loss of motivation that persists over
time (4 weeks or more), with the presence of at least one
symptom in at least two of the three following domains being
required: (1) loss of, or diminished, goal-directed behaviour;
(2) loss of, or diminished, goal-directed cognitive activity; and
(3) loss of, or diminished, emotions. Although initiative and
interest can theoretically be dissociated, it is quite uncommon
to find this distinction in clinical practice. Indeed, a lack of
interest is closely related to a lack of initiative and, on the other
hand, a lack of initiated actions may gradually lead to a lack of
interest. For instance, people with a loss of interest in their
leisure activities will in most cases end up initiating few actions
directed to these hobbies; conversely, people with difficulties
in initiating actions directed to their leisure activities are likely
to become detached and disinterested from these activities.
Accordingly, Sockeel et al. (2006) showed a significant corre-
lation (r=.56, p<.01) between the dimensions “intellectual
curiosity” and “action initiation” in the LARS. In this context,
it would be interesting to examine the relationships between a
lack of initiative and a lack of interest, using the IA that
evaluates separately these dimensions. Consequently, the es-
tablishment of diagnostic criteria based on these dimensions of
apathy seems largely debatable insofar as a loss of goal-
directed behaviour and a loss of goal-directed cognitive activ-
ity are strongly interrelated. Furthermore, Mulin et al. (2011)
postulated that change in motivation can be measured by
examining a patient’s responsiveness to internal and external
stimuli. For example, a “loss of spontaneous emotion” is
dissociated from a “loss of emotional responsiveness to posi-
tive and negative stimuli or events”. This distinction, particu-
larly the notion of “spontaneous emotion”, is contrary to most
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theories of emotion (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1999; Scherer 2001;
Ellsworth and Scherer 2003) that define emotions as an affec-
tive state triggered by or focused on an event or a situation.
More precisely, appraisal theories of emotion support the view
that the elicitation and the differentiation of emotions are
mainly determined by cognitive appraisals of an event such
as its relevance or implications for the person (Scherer 2001;
Sander et al. 2005). Consequently, it seems unlikely and
theoretically restricted to consider emotions as “spontaneous”.
A typical example of the ambiguities related to the cate-
gorical approach of apathy concerns the relationships between
apathy and depression. Some studies have reported that apa-
thy can occur independently from depression in neurological
disease (Marin et al. 1993; Kant et al. 1998; Levy et al. 1998;
Kirsch-Darrow et al. 2006). Although apathy can occur in the
absence of depression, however, most studies show that a
considerable proportion of patients exhibit both apathy and
depression (Andersson et al. 1999b; Starkstein et al. 2006).
This is not surprising, since apathy and depression share many
common features, as evidenced by their definition criteria. On
the one hand, the diagnosis of a major depressive episode
requires either a depressed mood or a loss of interest or
pleasure (according to the DSM-IV-TR, 2000), and on the
other hand, the diagnosis of apathy requires a loss of motiva-
tion in at least two of the following three dimensions
(according to Mulin’s criteria for apathy, 2011): reduced
goal-directed behaviour, goal-directed cognitive activity and
emotions. Thus, a loss of interest or pleasure and a loss of
goal-directed cognitive activity or emotions undoubtedly
overlap. In this sense, the recent confirmatory factor analysis
of individual items from the AS (Starkstein et al. 1992) and the
Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck et al. 1996)
conducted by Kirsch-Darrow et al. (2011) in patients with
Parkinson’s disease supports the evidence that a loss of inter-
est and of pleasure are common features to both apathy and
depression. More precisely, the analysis revealed a four-factor
structure: (1) an apathy factor representing a loss of motiva-
tion, (2) a dysphoric mood factor representing sadness and
negativity, (3) a loss of interest/pleasure factor representing
the features common to both apathy and depression and (4) a
somatic factor representing bodily complaints. Furthermore,
as we will see later, specific criteria for depression such as a
negative mood (Ready et al. 2003) could contribute to the
presence of apathetic manifestations. Indeed, replicated evi-
dence shows that moods have congruent effects on motivation
and behaviour in that people who face a challenge judge task
difficulty higher in a negative mood than in a positive mood,
which results in disengagement when the task is objectively
difficult (for reviews, see Gendolla and Brinkmann 2005;
Richter et al. 2006). More generally, it would be necessary
to examine precisely the overlaps and differences between
apathy and depression rather than considering these entities
as separate.
Further, apathy is better viewed as a continuum or spectrum
ranging from “mild” to “severe” impairments, rather than a
simple categorical disorder that places people into two catego-
ries, those who are “apathetic” and those who are “not apa-
thetic”. The categorical approach seems unable to capture the
diversity and complexity of the apathetic manifestations.
Indeed, in a recent comprehensive review of published
taxometric research that included 177 articles, Haslam et al.
(2012) showed that most psychological variation is dimension-
al, with a few potentially important exceptions. More specifi-
cally, the data strongly suggested that taxa are unlikely to be
found in the domains of normal personality and personality
disorders within the internalizing spectrum, such as mood,
anxiety and eating disorders, or in the general externalizing
domain. The only domains in which taxonic findings were at
least somewhat prevalent were schizotypy and substance use
disorders. Thus, the analysis of the taxometric literature sup-
ports the view that most psychological variation is dimensional
and that many influential taxonic findings of early taxometric
research are likely to be spurious. Furthermore, it is increas-
ingly recognised that behavioural disturbances are determined
by several factors (Riggio and Wong 2009). In particular,
Kendler et al. (2010) argue that psychiatric disorders—depres-
sion, anxiety and other psychopathological states—are not
defined in terms of essences, but in terms of complex, mutually
reinforcing networks of causal mechanisms. From this view,
Cramer et al. (2012) investigated the prediction of a common
cause framework by comparing the impact of four stressful life
events on disaggregated depressive symptoms in twins with a
dysphoric episode. The results showed that stressful life events
influence the correlations between depressive symptoms in
marked ways; these differences were significant and could
not be explained by underlying differences in acute liability
to develop a dysphoric episode. Instead, the results were better
explained by a network perspective, in which there is no
common cause and where the symptoms and direct (causal)
relations between them are the causes of psychiatric disorders.
These results are consistent with the strong inter-relationship
discussed previously between apathetic symptoms, particularly
between a lack of initiated actions (or lack of goal-directed
behaviours) and a lack of interest (or lack of goal-directed
thoughts). In the same way, it could be argue that emotional
blunting results in a lack of interest and inversely, a lack of
interest could lead to a lack of emotional reactivity. Thus, direct
relationships at the level of the symptoms themselves could be
involved in the occurrence of apathetic manifestations.
Interestingly, Kendler et al. (2010) have specified that psychi-
atric disorders result from more or less stable patterns of
complex interaction between neural systems, psychological
states, environmental inputs and socio-cultural variables. In
the same way, apathy seems associated with various psycho-
logical dysfunctions, some directly related to brain damage,
and others more related to psychological reactions (e.g.,
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negative mood) or to personal identity (e.g., self-esteem).More
specifically, biological factors, social factors and life events
could contribute to apathetic manifestations through their joint
effects on various psychological processes such as cognitive,
affective, motivational and relational processes. Thus, it ap-
pears obvious that a multifactorial and integrated approach,
which incorporates mechanisms at multiple levels, is clearly
required to gain a better understanding of apathy.
Apathy after TBI
TBI is characterised by a wide range of neurobehavioural
changes, representing a major source of disability and handi-
cap (Levin 1995; Kendall and Terry 1996). These distur-
bances are often perceived as most disabling for patients in
the long term as they attempt to reintegrate into family and
community life (Ownsworth and McKenna 2004; Kelly et al.
2008). Neurobehavioural disturbances have an important im-
pact on social integration and often lead to more frequent and
intensive consultations with health care centres. Recently,
Ciurli et al. (2011) sought to characterise neurobehavioural
changes among a group of 120 individuals with severe TBI.
Using the NPI (Cummings et al. 1994), the authors found that
family caregivers reported a wide range of neuropsychiatric
symptoms, such as apathy (42 %), irritability (37 %),
dysphoria/depressed mood (29 %), disinhibition (28 %), eat-
ing disturbances (27 %) and agitation/aggression (24 %).
Apathy was commonly described among the TBI population
(Andersson and Bergedalen 2002; Lane-Brown and Tate
2009) with serious consequences, notably for patients’ partic-
ipation in rehabilitation (Gray et al. 1994; Kant et al. 1998),
family life (Marsh et al. 1998) and later social reintegration
(Mazaux et al. 1997). Despite its frequent occurrence and its
negative impact on patients’ functioning, apathy is commonly
noted but rarely investigated among the TBI population.
Prevalence
Apathy was studied in the TBI population in nine studies that
used different scales such as the NPI, the FrSBe and, in
particular, the AES (see Table 3). Only those studies were
selected whose main objective was to measure the prevalence
of apathy or to characterize neuropsychiatric disorders follow-
ing TBI and in which the scores or percentages of apathy were
specified. Therefore, a total of 554 patients were assessed and
265 described as apathetic, with an average prevalence rate of
47.83 % (265 of 554). The lowest prevalence rate found in the
studies was 20 % (Al-Adawi et al. 2004) and the highest was
72 % (Lane-Brown and Tate 2009). These findings indicate
that apathy is a frequent symptom following TBI, but also
highlight the significant variation in prevalence rates, proba-
bly related to differences in the definition of apathy and the
assessment tools. Indeed, apathy is still described and assessed
in a number of different ways, with no instrument specially
developed or thoroughly validated for the TBI population
(Lane-Brown and Tate 2009).
Although one might expect to find greater apathy among
those with severe TBI, most studies do not report any corre-
lation between apathy and the severity of the brain injury, as
assessed by coma length, duration of post-traumatic amnesia
or the Glasgow Coma Scale (Van Zomeren and Van den Burg
1985; Andersson et al. 1999a; Glenn et al. 2002; Andersson
and Bergedalen 2002). Age and education were also found to
have no significant association with apathy among the TBI
population (Van Reekum et al. 2005; Andersson and
Bergedalen 2002). Some studies indicate that apathy is more
frequent or visible in the chronic phase than in the subacute
stage (Thomsen 1984; Van Zomeren and Van den Burg 1985;
Kelly et al. 2008). However, other studies found no significant
correlation between time since injury and apathy score
(Andersson et al. 1999a; Andersson and Bergedalen 2002;
Lane-Brown and Tate 2009). Kant et al. (1998) reported some
contrasting data from these studies, namely, that younger
patients were more likely to be apathetic than older patients
who were often both depressed and apathetic, but that patients
with severe injury were more likely to exhibit apathy alone.
Neuroanatomical Correlates of Apathy and TBI
Recently, Knuston et al. (2013) investigated the neural basis of
apathy in patients from the Vietnam Head Injury Study
(VHIS), an ongoing inpatient follow-up study of the long-
term sequelae of penetrating TBI (Raymont et al. 2011). The
results revealed that increased apathy symptoms were associ-
ated with brain damage to specific areas including the left
middle, superior and inferior frontal regions, insula, supple-
mentary motor area, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) as well
as lesions to the white matter tracts in the corona radiata and
the corpus callosum. Because of its various findings, this
study will be used as a common thread for the following
presentation on the neuroanatomical correlates of apathy in
the TBI population. It is of note that some data from other
neurological disorders (e.g., neurodegenerative diseases,
stroke or HIV) will be included in order to allow a broader
and more comprehensive view of the brain networks involved
in apathy.
Thus, as reported above, Knuston et al. (2013) showed that
apathy is associated with brain damage to frontal areas, in
particular the left middle, superior and inferior frontal regions
(including the operculum and pars triangularis). Other studies
conducted in patients with TBI found a specific association
between apathy and different prefrontal cortex regions. For
instance, Sarazin et al. (2003) reported a significant relation-
ship between apathy and decreased regional glucose metabo-
lism in the right medial area 10 among a group of patients with
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frontal lobe damage including traumatic lesions. These find-
ings are consistent with subsequent group studies of patients
with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)
(including the orbitofrontal) that have identified typical be-
havioural changes such as impaired goal-directed behaviour
and blunted affect (Barrash et al. 2000). More specifically,
several studies have shown that ventral and medial sectors of
the prefrontal cortex have been mainly associated with valu-
ation, reward learning, emotion regulation and decision-
making (Bechara et al. 1994; Fellows and Farah 2005a;
Glascher et al. 2012). Due to its crucial role in these psycho-
logical processes, and specifically in the ability to use emotion
to guide behaviour (see the role of the vmPFC in decision-
making and goal-directed activity, Damasio 1994), the
vmPFC could have a role to play in the occurrence of apathetic
manifestations in patients with TBI.
Furthermore, several studies have reported a specific asso-
ciation between apathy and other prefrontal cortex regions
such as the lateral prefrontal cortex or the ACC. Indeed,
Paradiso et al. (1999) showed that patients with lateral pre-
frontal damage had a greater reduction of motivation than
patients with medial prefrontal damage in a mixed population
of patients with frontal lobe pathology (both TBI and acute
stroke). In this sense, another research conducted in patients
with stroke showed a significant decreased blood flow in the
right dorsal lateral frontal and left fronto-temporal cortices in
patients with apathy compared to non-apathetic stroke con-
trols (Okada et al. 1997). These results point in the same
direction as accumulating evidence that demonstrates a key
role of the lateral prefrontal cortex in the executive control,
allowing in particular people to coordinate their thoughts and
actions with their intentions to support goal-directed social
behaviours (Raymont et al. 2011). Besides, several studies
reported that damage to the ACC is associated with apathy
both after a TBI (Knuston et al. 2013), or in the course of a
neurodegenerative disease (Benoit et al. 1999; Migneco et al.
2001; Zamboni et al. 2008; Massimo et al. 2009). More
specifically, it is argued that the ACC supports the selection
and maintenance of goal-directed behaviours, through its con-
tribution to cognitive control and reinforcement (Holroyd and
Yeung 2012). In addition, the ACC is thought to determine the
level of effort required to achieve the goal.
Another cortical structure, namely the insula, has been
associated with apathy in the TBI population (Knuston et al.
2013). Damage to insula could lead to reduced motivated
behaviour, due to a lack of awareness of emotional and moti-
vational states. Indeed, several findings in the literature have
demonstrated the role of the insula in emotion, attention,
cognitive control, intentions, awareness of body states and
time perception (Damasio 1994; Craig 2009). A specific as-
sociation between insula and apathy was also reported in
patients with stroke or neurodegenerative disorders (Manes
et al. 1999; Robert et al. 2012). For instance, Manes et al.
(1999) showed that patients with right insular infarction had a
significantly higher frequency of subjective anergia, under-
activity and tiredness than patients with either left insular
lesions or non-insular lesions. In this context, it has been
proposed that the anterior insula, through its intimate connec-
tions with amygdala, hypothalamus, ACC and orbitofrontal
cortex, serves to compute high-order meta-representation of
the primary interoceptive activity, which is related to the
feeling of pain and its emotional awareness (Craig 2007;
Decety 2011). These representations play an important role
in the learning and adaptation of prosocial behaviours (see the
role of the insula in empathy feeling for other’s emotions,
Adolphs 2009), and they may guide decision-making and
Table 3 Apathy prevalence rates in studies involving subjects with TBI
Author Sample
size
Injury severity Time since
injury (months)
Assessment instrument Percentage of
subjects with apathy
Van Zomeren and Van
den Burg (1985)
57 Severe 24 Personal 23 %
Kant et al. (1998) 83 62 mild, 8 moderate, 9 severe ? AES-S & AES-I (cut-off >34) 71.08 % (AES-S)
Marsh et al. (1998) 69 Severe 12.9 (±1.1) Head Injury Behaviour Rating
Scale (relative version)
Lack of motivation: 54 %,
lack of initiative: 42 %
Andersson et al. (1999a) 30 Severe 10.5 (±1.68) AES-C (cut-off >34) 66.7 %
Andersson et al. (1999b) 28 ? 12.6 (±10.99) AES-C (cut-off >34) 46.4 %
Andersson and Bergedalen
(2002)
53 Severe 12.2 (±10.06) AES-C (cut-off >34) 62.3 %
Al-Adawi et al. (2004) 80 6 mild, 2 moderate, 36 severe 8.35 (±4.50) AES-S Arabic language
version (cut-off >34)
20 %
Lane-Brown and Tate (2009) 34 Severe 80.58 (±71.64) AES-I (cut-off >37) and
FrSBe-A
AES-I: 69 % FrSBe-A: 72 %
Ciurli et al. (2011) 120 Severe 10.6 (±15.1) Neuropsychiatric Inventory 42 %
AES-C Apathy Evaluation Scale-Clinician version, AES-I Apathy Evaluation Scale-Informant version, AES-S Apathy Evaluation Scale-Self report
version, FrSBe-A Frontal Systems Behaviour Scale-Apathy sub-scale, TBI traumatic brain injury.
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homeostatic regulation (Singer et al. 2009). It is of note that
several studies have reported that the insula is vulnerable to
TBI (Bendlin et al. 2008; Dal Monte et al. 2012).
Some studies conducted in patients with TBI have
highlighted the role of subcortical areas, particularly the basal
ganglia, in the mechanism of apathy (Grunsfeld and Login
2006; Spalletta et al. 2012). It is of note that hemorrhagic
lesions occurring in the basal ganglia are frequently reported
in patients who have sustained a TBI (Xu et al. 2007; Shah
et al. 2012). A study by Finset and Andersson (2000) showed
in a mixed population of patients with acquired brain damage
including TBI that apathetic manifestations were most severe-
ly present in patients with subcortical lesions. In addition,
Grunsfeld and Login (2006) reported an interesting case study
of abulia in a patient who suffered penetrating brain injury
during endoscopic sinus surgery causing right basal ganglia
injury. Apathetic manifestations, lack of motivation and ini-
tiative were the changes that dramatically stood out after the
surgery. According to the authors, the patient illustrates the
consequence of disruption of fronto-subcortical circuits at the
level of the basal ganglia. Specifically, the anterior cingulate
circuit is reported to be essential for the initiation of behaviour,
motivation and goal-directed orientation. Moreover, apathy is
commonly experienced by patients with neurodegenerative
diseases that affect the basal ganglia, such as progressive
supranuclear palsy (Aarsland et al. 2001), Huntington’s dis-
ease (Hamilton et al. 2003) and Parkinson’s disease (Pluck
and Brown 2002). Basal ganglia probably constitute a key
network for motivation processes that enables expected re-
wards to energize behaviour without the need for the partici-
pants’ awareness (Pessiglione et al. 2007; Schmidt et al.
2008). More specifically, several contributors hypothesized
that apathy may at least partially result from fronto-basal
ganglia dysfunction, a network involved in the generation
and control of self-generated purposeful behaviours (Levy
and Dubois 2006).
Another aspect to consider in the neural basis of apathy is
the white matter tracts, which might induce disconnections
between cortical brain regions. Indeed, Knuston et al. (2013)
showed that apathy in penetrating TBI was significantly asso-
ciated with several areas of white matter, that is, the superior
and anterior corona radiata and the genus and body of the
corpus callosum. Several studies conducted in patient with
HIV or with Alzheimer’s disease have reported a significant
relationship between apathy and white matter damage, partic-
ularly in the corpus callosum (Hoare et al. 2010; Hahn et al.
2013). Given that damage to the white matter tracts is com-
mon following TBI, it would be interesting to explore the
relationships between white matter regions and the various
dimensions of apathy.
Interestingly, emerging findings conducted in patients with
chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE) reported that apathetic
manifestations are one of the most common neurobehavioural
changes following repetitive mild TBI (Baugh et al. 2012).
Recently, McKee et al. (2013) analyzed the brains of 85 indi-
viduals with a history of repetitive mild TBI and found evi-
dence of CTE in 68 subjects. Apathetic manifestations were
reported in patients with CTE, especially in those with a mod-
erate to severe p-tau pathology. To bemore precise, six of the 13
(46 %) patients with severe p-tau pathology, involving wide-
spread regions of the neuraxis including white matter with
prominent neuronal loss, gliosis of the cerebral cortex and
hippocampal sclerosis, were reported as apathetic by the family.
Thus, it seems that repetitive TBI and axonal injury might
trigger molecular pathways that result in the overproduction
and aggregation of other proteins which could be involved in
the development of apathy following repetitive TBI. In this
sense, multiple epidemiological studies have shown that trauma
is a risk for dementia (Shively et al. 2012), especially
Alzheimer’s disease, which is frequently associated with apa-
thetic manifestations (Fernandez Martinez et al. 2008).
Nevertheless, very few studies have to date specifically inves-
tigated the apathetic manifestations as well as their neural basis
in the CTE population. Consequently, the existing findings
must be interpreted with caution and further studies are needed
to examine the neurodegenerative changes and their relation-
ships with apathetic manifestations in patients with repetitive
TBI.
As reviewed above, cortical regions involved in the limbic
system such as the insular cortex or the orbitofrontal cortex
have been related to apathetic manifestations in patients with
TBI. Furthermore, several studies in the literature have clearly
pointed to the role of subcortical regions of the limbic system,
particularly the amygdala, in the pathophysiology of apathy.
Indeed, diminished amygdala activity is reported to cause
abnormal emotional responses resulting in apathy, fearless-
ness and/or aggressiveness (Mesulam 2000). More specifical-
ly, the amygdala is considered as a system for relevance
detection, i.e., necessary for detecting the extent to which
stimulus events are relevant for the current needs, goals and
values of the individual (Sander et al. 2003; Ousdal et al.
2008). In addition, numerous studies showed that patients
with amygdala damage were impaired on decision-making
tasks and failed to generate emotional responses when they
received a reward or a punishment (Bechara et al. 1999;
Weller et al. 2007). In this context, Adolphs (2003) specified
that amygdala is one of a set of structures that mediate the
association of perceptual representations of social signals with
emotional response, cognitive processing and behavioural
motivation. Thus, damage to the amygdala can have an impact
on the outcomes of goal-directed behaviours due to a
disrupted ability to assess the significance of social and emo-
tional signals. Besides, some studies have showed that the
amygdala, as well as the vmPFC, is activated when people
imagine positive future goals and hopes (Johnson et al. 2006;
Sharot et al. 2007). Diminished activity in these regions may
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underpin the long-term planning and foreshortened future
time perspective seen in apathetic individuals (Fellows and
Farah 2005b; Lawrence et al. 2011). Taken together, lesions to
the amygdala could lead to apathetic symptoms in patients
with TBI due a disruption in emotion, social behaviour and
reward processes. It is of note that damage to the amygdala is
reported in the TBI population as illustrated by the study of
Warner et al. (2010) which showed in patients with traumatic
axonal injury that the highest rates of atrophy among subcor-
tical structures were noted bilaterally in the amygdala.
In summary, the findings reviewed above indicate that
brain damage in cortical and subcortical areas, including the
lateral prefrontal cortex, the vmPFC, the ACC, the basal
ganglia, the insula as well as the white matter tracts connecting
these regions, are significantly related to apathetic manifesta-
tions following TBI (see Fig. 1). These data suggest that an
extensive brain network is involved in apathetic manifesta-
tions, which supports the hypothesis that apathy is not a single
entity but rather multiple (Stuss et al. 2000; Levy and Dubois
2006). In this context, it is essential to better understand the
contribution of the various components of this cerebral net-
work in the occurrence of apathetic manifestations as well as
the complex interactions between these components. More
specifically, additional studies are needed to identify the di-
verse vulnerable cerebral structures to TBI that could have an
impact on the integrity or functioning of this complex network
and to examine their links with apathetic manifestations. It
will be particularly interesting to conduct these studies in
patients with closed TBI that may have white matter shearing
and pathology, which is more extensive than lesions in pene-
trating TBI. Promising techniques for quantifying diffuse
injury such as diffusion tensor imaging may be useful for
characterizing microstructural brain injury contributing to re-
gional white matter loss in the TBI population.
Apathy and Other Neurobehavioural Disorders
Since there is considerable overlap in the clinical presentation
of apathy and depression, some studies have investigated the
co-occurrence of these disorders in patients with TBI (Kant
et al. 1998; Andersson et al. 1999b; Finset and Andersson
2000; Glenn et al. 2002; Lane-Brown and Tate 2009; Ciurli
et al. 2011). For instance, Kant et al. (1998) reported that
10.84 % of TBI patients seen consecutively in a neuropsychi-
atric clinic were apathetic but not depressed, while 60 % were
both apathetic and depressed. In most studies, apathy is more
common in TBI patients diagnosed with depression than in
those without depression (Andersson et al. 1999b), which
underlines, as seen previously, the important overlaps between
apathy and depression. In addition, Glenn et al. (2002) found a
moderate correlation between apathy (AES) and depression
(BDI) scores, arguing that it may not be possible to distinguish
between neurologically based apathy and apathy caused by
depression within the TBI population.
Furthermore, apathy is frequently reported with other
neurobehavioural syndromes in persons with TBI, such as
impulsive behaviours (Ciurli et al. 2011; McAllister 2008).
In 1990, Marin stressed the apparent contradiction of diag-
nosing apathy and disinhibition in the same patient. Some
studies have demonstrated a significant correlation between
apathy and disinhibition, but only in patients with dementia
(Levy et al. 1998; Starkstein et al. 2004). Indeed, no studies in
the literature have examined the relationships between apathy
and impulsive behaviours in patients with TBI. Recently,
Rochat et al. (2010) explored the nature of impulsivity
changes after moderate to severe TBI by using a multidimen-
sional approach (Whiteside and Lynam 2001). Urgency (ten-
dency to experience strong reactions, frequently under condi-
tions of negative affects), lack of perseverance (inability to
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remain focused on a task that may be boring or difficult) and
lack of premeditation (inability to anticipate the future conse-
quences of actions) significantly increased after TBI, whereas
sensation seeking (tendency to enjoy and pursue activities that
are exciting and openness to trying new experiences) de-
creased. According to the authors, the decrease observed in
the sensation seeking dimension could be due to apathy and
the associated motivational changes. Similarly, the lack of
perseverance reported in patients with TBI could depend on
motivational processes in that a decreased interest in activities
and/or goals may lead to poor mobilization of cognitive re-
sources required to complete complex tasks and/or goals.
Mechanisms Associated with Apathy after TBI
A few studies have sought to investigate the mechanisms
underlying apathy in patients with TBI. Andersson and
Bergedalen (2002) showed that apathy in the TBI population
was strongly linked to specific cognitive deficits, but relative-
ly unrelated to global intellectual efficiency. The authors
emphasised that patients are often perceived as more cogni-
tively impaired than they actually are, probably because lack
of motivation and reduced self-initiated actions tend to cam-
ouflage cognitive resources. In line with these findings, a
recent study reported that subjects with TBI demonstrated
significantly reduced goal-directed behaviours, diminished
motivation and a general lack of dynamism in comparison
with participants with mild mental retardation, despite having
consistently greater intellectual capacities (Cattelani et al.
2008). Andersson and Bergedalen (2002) showed that specific
cognitive deficits related to frontal lobe dysfunction were
associated with apathy; these included memory in terms of
acquisition and recall (as assessed by the California Verbal
Learning Test), executive functions (as assessed by the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) and psychomotor speed (as
assessed by the Trail Making Test). Several authors argued
that ecological tests are more sensitive to apathy than tradi-
tional executive measures that essentially focus on isolated
executive aspects without considering the demands of the real
world that involve multiple processes and self-initiated behav-
iours (Reid-Arndt et al. 2007; Esposito et al. 2010). To be
more precise, Muller et al. (2006) showed that apathetic TBI
patients had significantly reduced performance on the
Behavioural Assessment of Dysexecutive Syndrome battery
in comparison with non-apathetic TBI patients. In addition,
these results are in accordance with the findings of Esposito
et al. (2010) in patients with Alzheimer disease. The authors
reported that the number of rule breaks on the Modified Six
Elements Task (Wilson et al. 1996) was a significant predictor
of apathy, as assessed by the AI (Robert et al. 2009) and of
lack of initiative in particular.
Furthermore, apathy has been associated with some emo-
tional and motivational changes in TBI patients, in particular
those assessed with cardiovascular measures. Andersson et al.
(1999b) showed a significant relationship between apathy and
heart rate hyporeactivity, during a performance of the Raven’s
ProgressiveMatrices task and an arithmetic task, in 72 persons
with a TBI, stroke or hypoxic brain injury. In another study, in
contrast to non-apathetic TBI patients, apathetic TBI patients
did not display autonomic reactivity when communicating
their traumatic event, illustrating the emotional blunting and
lack of emotional responsivity associated with apathy
(Andersson et al. 1999a). This is further supported by the
subjective ratings of emotional discomfort, as apathetic TBI
patients find therapeutic interaction significantly less emotion-
ally disturbing than TBI patients without apathy. According to
Andersson et al. (1999a), the correlation between heart rate
hyporeactivity and the level of apathy should be understood in
the context of dysfunctional motivational and rewards sys-
tems. Indeed, enhancing motivation by adding, for example,
monetary incentives, has been shown to increase cardiovas-
cular reactivity in response to both social and mental stress
situations. In this context, apathy is also associated with
altered responses to novel stimuli in the TBI population, as
it correlates strongly with the reduction in hit scores for novel
stimuli on a unimanual two-choice response time test
(Godefroy and Rousseaux 1997).
In summary, few attempts have been made to examine the
mechanisms underlying apathy in patients with TBI.
However, the existing data support the argument that a variety
of mechanisms are at play in various facets of apathy after TBI
or more generally in persons with brain damage. In the fol-
lowing section, we propose a multidimensional framework
that takes into account the mechanisms at play in the various
dimensions of apathy.
Towards a Multidimensional Approach to Apathy
As noted previously, the exploration of apathy is to date
mostly descriptive, i.e. only based on the identification of
the various symptoms of apathy. However, most definitions
acknowledge that these symptoms are related to cognitive,
affective or behavioural dimensions but the precise identifica-
tion of the psychological processes underlying each dimen-
sion has remained relatively unexplored. Such an approach
could contribute to a better understanding of both socio-
emotional disorders following brain damage and the cerebral
and psychological components of apathy. Moreover, such an
approach is needed to ensure targeted and effective rehabili-
tation insofar as the same apathetic symptom could have
different etiologies. For instance, a lack of initiative could be
due to a dysfunction in executive processes such as in multi-
tasking as showed by Esposito et al. (2010) in patients with
Alzheimer disease or to a negative mood which is reported to
have a congruent effect on motivation through its effect on
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effort mobilization. In this context, we propose a new multi-
dimensional framework that assume four dimensions of apa-
thy (cognitive, affective, motivational and related to personal
identity), which are defined by a precise identification of the
various mechanisms potentially involved.
Cognitive Dimension
Apathy is commonly related to disruption of cognitive pro-
cessing, but the specific processes involved are still unclear.
According to Levy and Dubois (2006), the quantitative reduc-
tion of goal-directed behaviour could be due to impairments in
several executive functions that are needed to elaborate a plan
of action, such as impairments in planning, set shifting and rule
finding. The basic executive functions, inhibition, shifting,
updating, as defined in the model by Miyake et al. (2000), also
seem to be involved. More precisely, the inability to inhibit
prepotent responses could compromise the elaboration of ac-
tion plans that are suited to environmental requirements.
Individuals with set-shifting impairments might have difficul-
ties in finding alternative ways to resolve a complex situation,
which might decrease initiation towards goal attainment.
Furthermore, a deficit in updating and monitoring the contents
of working memory could affect the achievement of goal-
directed behaviours insofar as the relevant information would
not be updated and thus not taken into account in the action
plans. Various neuropsychological tests, that are sensitive to
cognitive impairments following TBI, could be used to evalu-
ate these basic executive functions such as the Hayling sen-
tence completion test (Burgess and Shallice 1997), the Trail
Making Test (Reitan and Wolfson 1988) or the n-back task
(Miyake et al. 2000; Owen et al. 2005). Another cognitive
process that might be relevant for better comprehension of
apathy is sustained attention. Some studies suggest that the
variability of reaction times results from difficulties in
maintaining or sustaining attention on task goals across time
due to executive dysfunction (West et al. 2002; Duchek et al.
2009). Rochat et al. (2013) have demonstrated that larger
variability in reaction times constitutes a significant predictor
of lack of perseverance (inability to remain focused on a task
that may be boring or difficult) in older adults with or without a
diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease. In this study, sustained at-
tention was evaluated using the Sustained Attention to
Response Task (Robertson et al. 1997), in which the partici-
pants must withhold a response to infrequent and unpredictable
stimuli (targets) during a period of rapid and rhythmic
responding to frequent stimuli (nontargets). Several studies
have demonstrated that this task provides a valid measure of
sustained attention (Dockree et al. 2004;Manly et al. 2003) and
is sensitive to deficits after TBI (McAvinue et al. 2005). Taken
together, attentional difficulties could contribute to apathy,
especially to loss of interest, due to progressive attentional
disengagement that compromises the achievement of a task.
Furthermore, the recent findings of Esposito et al. (2010) in
patients diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease suggested that
mechanisms underlying multitasking, such as coordination
between internal and external information, planning and pro-
spective memory, constitute a key component of goal-directed
behaviours. Indeed, Burgess et al. (2005) hypothesised that a
control system, “the supervisory attentional gateway system”,
should play a key role in the ability to flexibly allocate
attention towards either internal representations (stimulus-in-
dependent thought, i.e., goals, action plans, emotion, etc.) or
external information (stimulus-oriented thought, i.e., informa-
tion provided by the environment). This cognitive control
mechanism, which relies mainly on the activity of the rostral
prefrontal cortex (Brodmann’s area, BA 10), may support a
wide range of situations critical to competent human behav-
iour in everyday life, such as multitasking or remembering to
carry out intended actions after a delay (Burgess et al. 2005).
Thus, a disturbance that specifically affects the flexible allo-
cation of attention towards internal representations and exter-
nal information could contribute to the presence of apathetic
manifestations, and particularly to lack of initiative, by mak-
ing the person incapable of coordinating intentions and envi-
ronmental stimuli. The ability to flexibly allocate attention
between internal and external information could be assessed
with a task recently developed by Gilbert et al. (2005), in
which participants have to process stimuli in two alternating
experimental phases: a stimulus-oriented thought phase (cog-
nitive processes provoked by incoming sensory information)
and a stimulus independent thought phase (cognitive process-
es that are not related to any information in the immediate
sensory environment). Thus, future studies should explore the
integrity of the flexible allocation of attention between internal
and external information in the TBI population and their
relationships with apathetic manifestations.
Moreover, prospective memory also appears to be linked to
self-initiated behaviours insofar as it requires the occurrence
of the appropriate event or time to activate the memory of the
intention, without external solicitations, and to prompt the
person to initiate an action (Einstein et al. 1995). In terms of
assessment, two broad classes of prospective memory tasks
are distinguished (McDaniel and Einstein 2007): (1) the time-
based task requires that the person perform a specific task or
action at a certain time; (2) the event-based task requires that
the person perform an action when some external event oc-
curs. Time-based task is reported to involve a high degree of
controlled and self-initiated processes (Einstein andMcDaniel
1990). As impairment in multitasking is frequently reported in
patients with TBI (Rochat et al. 2009), it would be interesting
to explore multitasking components and their relationships
with the different facets of apathy within this population.
Multitasking could be assessed with the Modified Six
Elements Test (SET), which is a subtest of the Behavioural
Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (Wilson et al.
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1996). As seen previously, this open-ended task has been
shown to significantly predict apathy (lack of initiative in
particular) in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (Esposito
et al. 2010).
Motivational Dimension
The disruption of motivational processing, such as the inabil-
ity to associate affective and emotional signals with ongoing
and forthcoming behaviours, may also lead to apathy (Levy
and Dubois 2006). To be more precise, processes related to
positive reinforcement could play an important role in the
motivational aspects of apathy, notably by influencing antic-
ipation of pleasure and/or sensation seeking (Billieux et al.
2008). Favrod et al. (2009) showed a significant correlation
between anticipatory pleasure (capacity to feel pleasure about
future situations) and lack of initiative in persons with schizo-
phrenia. Indeed, we suggest that a deficit in anticipatory
pleasure may explain a decline in initiative because of a
reward system dysfunction and the inability to project oneself
into future pleasant situations.
As regards the reward system, some authors argue that
“wanting” (i.e., motivational incentive value of reward) and
“liking” (i.e., the hedonic value of reward) are states of mind
that can both be present before receipt of a reward and that can
concurrently influence reward seeking (Berridge and Robinson
1998; Leknes and Tracey 2010). The important point is that
“wanting” and “liking” are needed together for a full reward,
but they can be split apart under certain circumstances, espe-
cially by certain brain manipulations or damage. For example,
dopamine suppression leaves individuals virtually without
motivation for any pleasant incentive, but the hedonic impact
of the same incentives remains intact (Berridge 2004). In this
context, Vijayaraghavan et al. (2008) investigated the mecha-
nisms underlying motivational changes in a patient (PJ) who
developed complete bilateral damage to the globus pallidus
after a prolonged state of cerebral anoxia. Marked reduction in
spontaneous speech, movement, emotional expression and
motivation ensued after the lesion. PJ and 30 male controls
performed a task designed to parse hedonic evaluation from
incentive motivation. In this task, emotionally laden visual
stimuli are presented to the subject, who has the option to
increase or decrease the time to view the images. The behav-
ioural measure of wanting corresponds to the amount of work
done by the subject to change the viewing time. Liking is
measured by the subject’s evaluation of pleasantness of the
stimuli. The results indicated that, compared with healthy
controls, PJ showed normal ratings of hedonic appreciation
in response to pleasant stimuli, but significantly reduced view-
ing time of these stimuli. The investigators concluded that
active withdrawal from liked stimuli could constitute the core
mechanism underlying the motivational disorder associated
with globus pallidus damage.
The findings of Schmidt et al. (2008) showed that the
process of translating expected rewards into behavioural acti-
vation was specifically impaired in patients with an auto-
activation deficit (AAD) induced by bilateral striato-pallidal
lesions. Indeed, Schmidt et al. (2008) designed an original
behavioural paradigm dissociating an instructed (externally
driven) task, in which subjects are explicitly instructed about
how hard they must squeeze a hand grip, from an incentive
(self-driven) task, in which subjects are free to squeeze the
hand grip as they wish, but are aware that the higher the force
exerted, the larger the monetary payoff. Skin conductance was
simultaneously measured to index affective evaluation of
monetary incentives. Patients with AAD showed correct grip
force response to external instructions and skin conductance
response to monetary incentives. However, they failed to
modulate their force in accordance to monetary incentives.
In other words, AAD patients assigned adapted affective
values to potential rewards, but failed to integrate these values
into their physical effort. Thus, dysfunction in incentive mo-
tivation, the process that translates an expected reward (or
goal) into behavioural activation, seems to be involved in
apathetic manifestations. Further studies are required to pre-
cisely investigate the nature of motivational changes related to
dysfunction of the reward system (and their major compo-
nents) and their links with the different facets of apathy.
Another aspect to consider in the motivational dimension of
apathy is the intensity of motivation, which can be defined as
the amount of effort mobilized to attain a goal. Effort has been
considered as a central aspect of goal-directed behaviour in all
comprehensive models of human goal striving (Gollwitzer
1993; Carver and Scheier 1998; Ryan and Deci 2000).
According to the motivational intensity theory (Brehm and
Self 1989; Wright and Kirby 2001), human behaviour is guid-
ed by an energy conservation principle, namely, that people
will avoid wasting resources and thus will not mobilize more
effort than necessary for goal attainment. Drawing on this
assumption, the theory predicts that experienced task difficulty
and importance of success interact to determine effort mobili-
zation: resources are mobilized proportionally to the level of
experienced task demand as long as success appears possible
and worthwhile (Brehm and Self 1989; Gendolla and Wright
2005; Wright and Kirby 2001). These predictions were con-
firmed in several studies that used physiological measures of
effort mobilization. Indeed, these studies reported that the
influence of the sympathetic nervous system on the cardiovas-
cular system increases with momentary effort mobilization and
that sympathetic nervous activity is reliably reflected in in-
creased systolic blood pressure and heart contractility (Obrist
1981; Wright 1996; Gendolla and Wright 2005; Richter and
Gendolla 2009). For instance, Richter et al. (2008) showed an
effect of task difficulty on effort mobilization through cardiac
measures of healthy participants. Specifically, the experiment
consisted of a recognition memory task (adapted from
Neuropsychol Rev (2013) 23:210–233 223
Sternberg 1966) that required participants to indicate repeated-
ly whether a probe character was in a preceding string of
characters. Difficulty was manipulated by displaying the initial
string for 1,000 ms (low difficulty), 550 ms (moderate diffi-
culty), 100 ms (high difficulty) or 15 ms (extreme difficulty).
Results showed that contractility and systolic blood pressure
responses rose progressively from the low to the moderate to
the high difficulty condition, and then dropped. Furthermore,
several physiological studies have reported the effects of situ-
ational factors affecting the perceived task difficulty and the
amount of justified effort (for a review, see Gendolla et al.
2012), such as conscious mood states (discussed below), self-
efficacy beliefs (Wright 1998) and fatigue (Wright and Stewart
2012). From these findings, it is possible to hypothesise a
relationship between effort mobilization and apathy in brain-
damaged persons through the influence of cognitive impair-
ments. Indeed, individuals with cognitive deficits (attentional,
executive, memory, etc.) are likely to mobilize more effort in
response to easy cognitive challenges (in order to compensate
for their cognitive deficits) and to disengage earlier when the
tasks become more difficult. Nevertheless, this hypothesis
should be examined more directly.
Affective Dimension
Some affective factors could contribute to the presence of
apathetic manifestations. Emotional disorders, and particularly
depression, are among the most frequently encountered distur-
bances after TBI (Tate 1999; Kreutzer et al. 2001). Although
estimates vary, the prevalence of depression appears to be
approximately 18.5 % to 61 % in the TBI population (Kim
et al. 2007), with several negative outcomes reported on pa-
tients’ functioning (Hibbard et al. 2004). For instance, Fann
et al. (1995) showed that depressed TBI patients perceive their
injury and their cognitive deficits as being more severe than
non-depressed TBI patients do, despite the lack of differences
in objective measures of severity of injury and cognitive func-
tioning. As mentioned previously, relationships between apa-
thy and depression are characterized by many common fea-
tures. Given this important overlap, it would be interesting to
explore the links between the dimensions of apathy and other
aspects of depression that are not characteristic of apathetic
manifestations, such as negative mood (sadness, hopeless-
ness). Negative mood is reported to be specific to depression,
but not a feature of apathy (Ready et al. 2003). According to
various theories and particularly the Mood-Behavior-Model
(MBM; Gendolla 2000), moods have an impact on motivation
and behaviour. Indeed, the MBM posits that mood states can
systematically influence the intensity and persistence of be-
haviour in contexts that call for effort investment because
people use their moods as information for behaviour-related
judgments and appraisals (Abele and Gendolla 1999; Gendolla
and Brinkmann 2005). This assumption is built on the well-
established phenomenon that mood states can influence judg-
ments by means of a mood congruency effect (Clore et al.
1994; Wyer et al. 1999; Gendolla and Krüsken 2002), in that
people in a positive mood make more optimistic judgments
than do people in a negative mood. Consequently, the MBM
considers the extent of subjective demand to be higher in a
negative mood than in a positive mood when people are
confronted with a challenge (Gendolla et al. 2001). Several
studies using mood induction procedures in healthy popula-
tions have shown that negative affect increases demand ap-
praisals of difficult situations, which improves subsequent
effort mobilization, as measured by cardiovascular adjustments
(for reviews, Gendolla and Brinkmann 2005; Richter et al.
2006). For instance, Gendolla and Krusken (2001) demonstrat-
ed a joint effect of manipulated mood state and task difficulty
on cardiovascular and electrodermal reactivity in a group of
university students. As regards the assessment, participants
were induced into positive versus negative moods by exposure
to music and later performed a letter cancellation task, adapted
from the d2 Mental Concentration Test (Brickenkamp 1981).
The results showed that cardiovascular reactivity was signifi-
cantly stronger in a negative mood than in a positive mood
when the task is easy. Conversely, reactivity was significantly
stronger in a positive mood than in a negative mood when the
task was difficult. Furthermore, Brinkmann and Gendolla
(2008) reported that dysphoric individuals tend to appraise an
easy task as difficult, and a difficult task as too difficult and
impossible. Consequently, dysphoric individuals mobilized
more effort than non-dysphoric individuals for an easy task
and less effort for a difficult task, which results in disengage-
ment of the task. Thus, negative mood may contribute to
apathy by increasing the subjective difficulty of the tasks or
goals. Studies are needed to explore the possible impact of
negative mood on goal-directed behaviours.
Other emotional factors such as anhedonia could have a
role to play in apathy. Following the criteria of Marin (1991)
and their subsequent revisions, anhedonia (defined as the
reduction in the ability to experience pleasure) may be part
of the apathy’s syndrome (Leentjens et al. 2008). Anhedonia
has long been recognised as a core symptom of depression,
but has regained attention as a dysfunction of the dopaminer-
gic reward pathway (Fujiwara et al. 2011). The inability to
experience pleasurable emotions could have an impact on
reward seeking and thus, self-initiated behaviours. There are
several rating scales to assess anhedonia such as the Snaith-
Hamilton Pleasure Scale (Snaith 1993), the Chapman scales
for physical and social anhedonia (Chapman et al. 1976) or the
SANS Anhedonia-Asociality subscale (Andreasen 1989).
Dimension Linked to Personal Identity, Values and Beliefs
Aspects linked to personal identity should be taken into ac-
count in the identification of the mechanisms underlying
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apathy (Prigatano 1992; Sagen et al. 2010). For instance, low
self-esteem could dissuade the individual from undertaking
complex tasks. Indeed, some studies showed that low self-
esteem is related to an avoidant coping style in individuals
with TBI (Anson and Ponsford 2006; Riley et al. 2010). More
specifically, Riley et al. (2010) reported in a group of 41 TBI
patients that those with low self-esteem and a negative eval-
uation of their coping resources were significantly more likely
to respond to threat appraisals with avoidance. According to
the authors, this link may occur in part because low self-
esteem leads to an avoidance of further challenges to self-
esteem, and this results in withdrawal and restricted participa-
tion. Self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg self-
esteem scale (Rosenberg 1965; Wright et al. 1995), which is
reported to have satisfactory reliability in several acquired
brain injury studies (Cooper-Evans et al. 2008). The findings
of Riley et al. (2010) are in accordance with broader evidence
that people who are low in self-esteem are more likely to focus
on its protection rather than on steps to bolster it (Baumeister
et al. 1989; Tice 1991; Heimpel et al. 2006). Thus, low self-
esteem could contribute to apathetic manifestations by leading
individuals to avoid valued activities in order to protect their
self-esteem from threat. Studies are required to explore self-
esteem and its relationships with apathy in patients with TBI.
Several studies on self-esteem in children with brain injury
have reported a significant low level of self-esteem in children
with TBI compared with controls and an association between
low self-esteem and behavioural problems (Tremblay et al.
1992; Andrews et al. 1998; Hawley 2012).
In the same way, self-efficacy beliefs may be involved in
apathy. Self-efficacy has been conceptualised as “the belief in
one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action
required to manage prospective situations” (Bandura 1995, p.
2). According to Bandura, self-efficacy plays a major role in
how goals and challenges are approached and can have an
impact on motivation. More precisely, self-efficacy beliefs
influence motivation by determining the goals people set,
how much effort they invest in achieving those goals and their
resilience when faced with difficulties or failure. Thus, people
with low self-efficacy tend to set relatively low goals for
themselves and to give up when problems surface because
they believe that they are incapable of performing a difficult
task. In this context, several studies have recently shown a
relationship between perceived self-efficacy regarding cogni-
tive abilities and participation or life satisfaction in patients
with TBI (Dumont et al. 2004; Wood and Rutterford 2006;
Cicerone and Azulay 2007). For instance, Dumont et al.
(2004) found that a high level of self-efficacy was a predictor
of social participation after TBI, suggesting that belief in one’s
ability to engage in daily activities and valued social roles
increases motivation and thereby opportunities for improving
social participation. Anecdotally, field experimenters have
targeted self-efficacy as an effective way of increasing
motivation at work in healthy adults. Thus, in a self-
management training program conducted by Frayne and
Latham (1987), workers’ absenteeism was reduced by raising
their self-efficacy beliefs regarding work. Taken together,
these findings appear to show that self-efficacy could have a
role to play in apathetic manifestations. Further research is
needed to investigate the integrity of self-efficacy and its links
with the different facets of apathy in patients with TBI.
Regarding assessment, general (Dumont et al. 2004) and
specific measures of self-efficacy (Cicerone et al. 2008;
Malec et al. 2010) were developed. For instance, Cicerone
and Azulay (2007) have developed a measure of perceived
self-efficacy for management of symptoms following TBI, the
TBI Self-Efficacy Questionnaire, that incorporate three sub-
scales: the ability to obtain assistance, the ability to manage
cognitive symptoms and the ability to manage emotional
symptoms. The scale developer’s have reported good internal
reliability (Cicerone and Azulay 2007; Cicerone et al. 2008)
but replication studies are needed.
Furthermore, interest has clear motivational and goal com-
ponents, particularly for exploration, information seeking and
learning (Schiefele et al. 1992; Krapp 1999; Sansone and
Smith 2000). As advanced by Silvia (2005), interest is closely
related to cognitive appraisals, which are determinants of
emotions (Roseman and Smith 2001). In particular, two spe-
cific cognitive appraisal processes seem to be related to inter-
est (Silvia 2006): (1) an evaluation of the event’s novelty and
complexity, which refers to evaluating an event as new, unex-
pected, complex, surprising or mysterious; and (2) an evalu-
ation of the event’s comprehensibility (“coping potential”),
which involves considering whether one has the skills, knowl-
edge and resources to deal with an event (Lazarus 1991).
Thus, a deficit in one of two cognitive evaluations could
contribute to the presence of apathetic manifestations and
particularly to lack of interest. Most of the experiments that
assessed interest have used real-world stimuli, such as abstract
art or contemporary poetry and asked participants to rate each
picture for interest and for appraisals. The results showed that
the more novel and more comprehensible people rate a pic-
ture, the more they rate it as interesting. In short, events
appraised as new and complex, yet potentially comprehensi-
ble, are experienced as interesting.
In addition, the ability to envision future events (“future
thinking”), which refers to the capacity to momentarily disen-
gage from the immediate environment in order to contemplate
hypothetical future scenarios (Suddendorf and Corballis 1997;
Wheeler et al. 1997), could have a role to play in apathy.
Future-oriented thoughts are reported to be pervasive in daily
life (Klinger and Cox 1987) and to have a strong adaptive
value (Tulving 2005; Suddendorf and Corballis 2007; Boyer
2008). Indeed, several studies have shown that the simulation
of future events serves a number of functions, such as decision
making (Bechara and Damasio 2005; D'Argembeau et al.
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2009), action planning (Gollwitzer 1999), problem solving
(Oettingen 1996), emotion regulation (Taylor et al. 1998;
D'Argembeau et al. 2009) and goal achievement (Taylor
et al. 1998). Thus, a decreased ability to imagine future events
could contribute to the presence of apathetic manifestations by
making the person incapable of considering potential conse-
quences prior to acting and hence overriding current needs in
favour of long-term goals. Further, difficulties in elaborating
and maintaining in one’s mind a specific and detailed reward
representation could alter its internal evaluation and conse-
quently decrease anticipated pleasure expectation, leading to
motivation deficits for goal-directed behaviour. Nevertheless,
these hypotheses should be examined more directly.
Rasmussen and Berntsen (2012) recently examined the ability
to imagine possible events in the personal future in a sample of
moderate-to-severe TBI patients. To examine these issues, the
authors adopted a standard method based on D'Argembeau
and Van der Linden (2004), which involved asking partici-
pants to imagine and describe a series of specific events from
the personal future. TBI patients imagined significantly fewer
episodic, event-specific details compared with healthy con-
trols. In this context, Raffard et al. (2013) showed that apathy
is specifically associated with difficulties imaging future
pleasant events, and particularly poor self-referential informa-
tion, in patients with schizophrenia. According to the authors,
negative self-beliefs associated with reduced optimism about
future could lead to apathetic manifestations through its neg-
ative impact on the ability to imagine future pleasant events. In
addition, D'Argembeau et al. (2010) showed that executive
processes involved in the organisation and monitoring of
autobiographical retrieval were correlated with several mea-
sures of future thinking. Given the frequent impairment in
strategic aspects of memory in patients with TBI (Azouvi et al.
2009), it would be interesting to explore the relationships
between these executive processes, the ability to imagine
future events and the various apathy dimensions.
Conclusions
Apathetic manifestations are commonly reported in the TBI
population and have been associated with a wide range of
negative consequences for the patients and their caregivers.
However, the exploration of apathy is to date mostly descrip-
tive and the psychometric properties of the apathy assessment
scales are questionable. For instance, a strong inter-
relationship is reported between two apathetic dimensions that
is, a lack of interest and a lack of initiative. It is of note that a
link between other apathetic dimensions such as an emotional
blunting and a lack of interest is hypothesized. Given these
relationships, it seems inappropriate to define or establish
diagnostic criteria for apathy only on the basis of a symptom-
atic approach. Indeed, the identification of the psychological
processes underlying the apathetic manifestations seems also
essential to ensure a better understanding of this disabling
disturbance.
As reviewed above, there is evidence in the TBI literature
that a variety of psychological mechanisms are involved in
apathy. In fact, some studies showed that cognitive as well as
affective and motivational processes are implicated in apathy.
Further, the various neuroanatomical regions involved in ap-
athy support the diversity of the psychological processes
related to this behavioural disorder. Specifically, the findings
indicate that brain damage in cortical and subcortical areas,
including the lateral prefrontal cortex, the vmPFC, the ACC,
the basal ganglia, the insula as well as the white matter tracts
connecting these regions, are involved in apathy among the
TBI population. Nevertheless, the studies focused on the
identification of the various factors involved in the occurence
of apathetic manifestations remain few in number and have
not taken into account the various dimensions of apathy (i.e.
only a global score of apathy was considered in these studies).
More generally, findings in the literature increasingly sup-
port the need to adopt a multifactorial and integrative ap-
proach towards behavioural disorders, focused on the precise
identification of the various psychological mechanisms in-
volved in the various dimensions of the disorder. The interac-
tions between psychological processes and other mechanisms,
such as neural systems, environmental inputs and socio-
cultural variables, must also be taken into consideration.
Such an approach seems to have the potential to capture the
diversity and complexity of the apathetic manifestations oc-
curring after TBI. In this context, we propose a new multidi-
mensional framework that takes into account the various
psychological mechanisms at play in the facets of apathy, such
as cognitive aspects (e.g., executive processes, sustained at-
tention, mechanisms underlying multitasking), motivational
aspects (e.g., positive reinforcement, effort mobilization), af-
fective aspects (e.g., negative mood, anhedonia) and aspects
linked to personal identity (e.g., self-esteem or self-efficacy,
interest, future thinking). It is of note that most psychological
processes, including those described in this model, are fre-
quently reported to be disrupted in patients with TBI.
Research is clearly needed to confirm and develop this
model, notably by using longitudinal studies in order to in-
vestigate the predictive role of these processes in the occur-
rence and persistence of apathetic manifestations. Moreover,
further studies are also required to explore the interactions
between the various psychological processes involved in ap-
athy and more specifically, to identify potential mediator
variables. For instance, it would be interesting to examine
the links between effort mobilization and apathy and to con-
sider the extent to which these relationships may be influenced
by factors such as negative mood or self-efficacy beliefs.
Indeed, theoretical models of self-efficacy postulate that the
latter determines in part how much effort an individual will
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invest to achieve a goal (Bandura 1995). In this perspective,
Esposito et al. (2013) have recently showed in elderly people
that the subjective demand of a memory task (i.e., perceived
difficulty and estimated effort) operated as a mediator between
self-efficacy beliefs and apathy.
The precise identification of the underlying mechanisms of
apathy is much needed to enable the development of targeted
and effective rehabilitation insofar as some apathy traits result
in similar overt behaviours although their causes may be
heterogeneous. In this regard, it is essential to implement
psychological interventions for apathetic manifestations that
are tailored to the specific psychological dysfunctions of the
person, interventions that do not currently exist. Such a psy-
chological approach, focused on the person, would address
the problem of apathy in all its complexity and unique expres-
sion. Besides, the specification of the various psychological
mechanisms involved in apathymay also contribute to a better
identification of others mechanisms such as neuroanatomical
correlates insofar as studies should be more guided by specific
hypotheses.
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